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We currently lack a unified and mechanistic account of how the hippocampus supports a range of
disparate cognitive functions that includes episodic memory, imagining the future, and spatial navigation.
Here, we argue that in order to leverage this long-standing issue, traditional notions regarding the
architecture of memory should be eschewed. Instead, we invoke the idea that scenes are central to
hippocampal information processing. This view is motivated by mounting evidence that the hippocampus
is constantly constructing spatially coherent scenes, automatically anticipating and synthesizing repre-
sentations of the world beyond the immediate sensorium. By characterizing the precise relationship
between scenes and the hippocampus, we believe a theoretically enriched understanding of its funda-
mental role and its breakdown in pathology can emerge.
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Two issues are often conflated: how do we learn and remember
our past experiences (episodic memory), and what does the hip-
pocampus do. Despite the hippocampus being widely regarded as
the quintessential episodic memory device, memory and the hip-
pocampus are not simply interchangeable. Episodic memory is so
much more than the hippocampus. We know this because episodic
memory subsumes multiple cognitive processes, some of which
are not hippocampal dependent (Nyberg, Kim, Habib, Levine, &
Tulving, 2010). The hippocampus is also so much more than
episodic memory. Although this has long been recognized in the
animal literature (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), it has become increas-
ingly apparent over the past two decades that the human hip-
pocampus is also vital for a variety of cognitive functions that are
not purely mnemonic, including spatial navigation (Spiers &
Maguire, 2006), but also imagining fictitious (Hassabis, Kumaran,
& Maguire, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007)
and future experiences (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2009). To
truly ascertain, then, what it is the hippocampus does, a useful
strategy may be to consider the range of disparate cognitive
functions that have been linked to it and deduce from this what
common underlying processes or mechanisms may be hippocam-
pally mediated.
Motivated by recent neuropsychological and neuroimaging find-
ings, what follows are our current thoughts about this issue,
culminating in a hypothesis that describes what we think the
hippocampus does. This piece is not intended to be a forensic
comparison of hippocampal theories, or an exhaustive literature
review. We acknowledge that what we propose is not bulletproof
and requires a good deal more investigation. Rather, our goal is to
offer a fresh perspective, to stimulate new ways of thinking about
the hippocampus. It is 56 years since formal cognitive studies of
the human hippocampus began in earnest (Scoville & Milner,
1957), and yet we remain bereft of a widely agreed-upon answer
to what it does. Our point here is that now may be the time to start
asking different questions.
Episodic Memory and Imagination
Two cognitive functions that have received much scrutiny in
recent years are recollecting episodes from the past and imagining
experiences that have not actually occurred. Whereas the former
has a strong mnemonic context, the latter, residing in the realm of
the imagination, seems to have less to do with memory. The
finding that patients with bilateral hippocampal lesions have pro-
found deficits on both tasks (Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, Ai-
zenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire,
2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Mullally, Intraub, &
Maguire, 2012; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Rosenbaum,
Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009; Tulving, 1985)
therefore offered a novel avenue down which to explore the
function of the human hippocampus.
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One process that episodic memory and imagining future
events seem to share is a subjective sense of the self over time
(“autonoesis”; Tulving, 2002), which is closely coupled with
the capacity for mental time travel (the ability to project oneself
forwards or backwards in time). If the hippocampus is critical
for this function, then it is not surprising that damage to the
hippocampus impairs both episodic memory and future thinking
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007). This hypothesis accommodates the
neuropsychological profiles of patients like K.C. (Tulving,
1985) and D.B. (Klein et al., 2002), who were unable to recall
their personal past or to imagine their own future. However, it
does not account for why patients with hippocampal amnesia
cannot construct spatially coherent atemporal fictitious scenes
(see Figure 1), a task that is not future oriented or personally
relevant (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Mul-
lally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012).
Couching these patients’ deficits in terms of mental time travel
and self-projection therefore seems insufficient. Indeed, a recent
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study revealed that
frontal and parietal cortices, but not the hippocampus, supported
mental time travel (Nyberg et al., 2010). Andrews-Hanna, Reidler,
Sepulcre, Poulin, and Buckner (2010) showed that imagining
scenes actually accounted best for activity in the hippocampus and
medial temporal lobes, whereas other regions were concerned with
the self and time. Overall, it seems that although the conscious
awareness of time could be a core component of episodic memory,
and the hippocampus might make use of temporal information
when pertinent to the task at hand (MacDonald, Lepage, Eden, &
Eichenbaum, 2011), the evidence suggests that for the hippocam-
pus, it may not be primarily about time (Hassabis & Maguire,
2007).
The scene construction deficit observed in patients with
bilateral hippocampal damage (Andelman et al., 2010; Hassa-
bis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Mullally, Intraub, &
Maguire, 2012; Race et al., 2011; Rosenbaum et al., 2009;
Tulving, 1985), coupled with reports of selective scene-
processing deficits following hippocampal damage (reviewed in
Lee, Yeung, & Barense, 2012) and the fMRI observations that
the healthy hippocampus is engaged when imagining fictitious
(Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007) and future (Addis et al.,
2007) scenes, led Hassabis and Maguire (2007, 2009) to pro-
pose the scene construction theory (SCT). The SCT posits that
the hippocampus facilitates the construction of atemporal
scenes allowing the event details of episodic memories and
imagined future experiences to be martialed, bound and played
out in a coherent spatial context. In this way, scene construction
is held to underpin not only episodic memory and imagining the
future but also cognitive functions such as spatial navigation
(see Figure 2), and perhaps even mind wandering and dreaming.
Placing scenes at the center of hippocampal information pro-
cessing has intuitive appeal. For most people, recalling the past,
thinking about the future, and planning how to get somewhere
typically involves imagining scenes. Scenes are also a highly
efficient way of packaging information.
The suggestion is not that the hippocampus alone is wholly
responsible for all of these cognitive functions, but rather SCT
proposes that despite the differences between them, these functions
each require a crucial ingredient that is supplied by the hippocam-
pus, and that is the ability to internally construct spatially coherent
scenes. This resonates with the patients’ experiences of trying to
imagine scenes:
There is no scene in front of me here. It’s frustrating because I feel
like there should be. I feel like I’m listening to the radio instead of
watching it on the TV. I’m trying to imagine different things happen-
Figure 1. Examples of imagined scenarios. The cue is shown at the top, below which is an excerpt from P03,
a patient with bilateral hippocampal damage, followed by that of a matched control participant. Reprinted from
“Patients With Hippocampal Amnesia Cannot Imagine New Experiences,” by D. Hassabis, D. Kumaran, S. D.
Vann, and E. A. Maguire, 2007, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 104, p. 1727. Copyright 2007 by the National Academy of Sciences.
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ing, but there’s no visual scene opening out in front of me. (Mullally,
Intraub, & Maguire, 2012, p. 266)
It’s hard trying to get the space, it keeps getting squashed. (Mullally,
Intraub, & Maguire, 2012, p. 266).
Is this inability to imagine scenes responsible for the failure of
both episodic memory and episodic-like imagination, or can ex-
isting theoretical frameworks account for these findings?
Scene Construction and Relational Memory
An alternative explanation for these results is the constructive
episodic simulation hypothesis (reviewed in Schacter et al., 2012).
This theory proposes that simulation-related processes such as
episodic memory, future thinking, and scene construction all re-
quire the extraction of relevant episodic details from memory and
the recombination of these details to form fictitious simulations of
novel scenes or events, and it is these processes that depend on the
integrity of the hippocampus. In a similar vein, the relational
theory proposes that the hippocampus is required for binding
arbitrary or accidentally occurring relations among individual el-
ements within an experience (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993;
Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Konkel & Cohen, 2009). By this
account, one could argue that the patients failed to generate novel
scenes because they were unable to bind together the disparate
elements of the fictitious scene into a coherent whole, or they
could not bind the items to the specific scene context (the binding
of items and contexts model, reviewed in Ranganath, 2010).
These theories deny that there is anything special about the role
of the hippocampus in the imagination of scenes, other than in
constructing a scene, you must first retrieve the discrete scene
elements from memory (constructive episodic simulation hypoth-
esis) and bind them to one another and/or to the scene context
(relational theory; binding of items and contexts model; construc-
tive episodic simulation hypothesis). But is it possible, as asserted
by SCT, that the hippocampus is engaged with scenes over and
above binding items together or to a context? Evidence has
emerged recently that suggests this may be the case (Mullally,
Intraub, & Maguire, 2012).
Scene Construction and Boundary Extension
These new insights have arisen by bringing to bear a phenom-
enon not usually linked to the hippocampus, namely, boundary
extension (BE; Intraub & Richardson, 1989). BE is where people
remember seeing more of a scene than was present in the physical
input, because they extrapolate beyond the borders of the original
stimulus (see Figure 3). It is a robust and consistent effect found in
adults (Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Seamon, Schlegel, Hiester,
Figure 3. The phenomenon of boundary extension (BE). When we see a
picture of a scene (top panel), we automatically extrapolate beyond the
physical edges of that scene (second panel). This active extension of the
scene is the “BE effect” (Phase 1). In Phase 2, when exactly the same
picture is presented at test (fourth panel), we compare the now-extended
internal representation of the original scene (third panel) to the test picture,
leading to the impression that the test picture is “closer” than the original
study picture, even though they are identical. This memory error is the “BE
error.” From “The Hippocampus Extrapolates Beyond the View in Scenes:
An fMRI Study of Boundary Extension,” By M. J. Chadwick, S. L.
Mullally, and E. A. Maguire, in press, Cortex. Copyright by Elsevier.
Reprinted with permission.
Figure 2. Scene construction theory contends that episodic memory,
navigation, imagining fictitious scenes, and imagining the future encom-
pass many processes that are not the primary concern of the hippocampus.
Nevertheless, it proposes that they each rely on the hippocampus for a
critical component, which is the construction of spatially coherent scenes.
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Landau, & Blumenthal, 2002), children (Seamon et al., 2002), and
even babies (Quinn & Intraub, 2007). Of note, it only occurs in
relation to scenes and not single isolated objects (Gottesman &
Intraub, 2002). Interestingly, this dissociation mirrors the imagi-
nation profile observed in amnesic patients, where they are able to
imagine single isolated objects, but cannot imagine scenes (Has-
sabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). BE is composed of two
stages (see Figure 3). The first (the BE effect) requires intact scene
construction because it involves the active extrapolation of the
scene beyond its physical boundaries resulting in an internally
generated “extended scene” representation, which persists when
the scene is no longer visible. The second phase (the BE error)
occurs at retrieval when this internally generated extended scene is
conflated with the previously viewed scene from Phase 1, produc-
ing a memory error. Thus, when people are presented consecu-
tively with exactly the same scene, they consistently judge the
scene that is viewed second as being closer-up than the first scene,
even though the two scenes are identical. The original scene need
only be absent for as little as 42 ms for BE to be apparent,
underscoring the online and spontaneous nature of the BE effect
(Intraub & Dickinson, 2008).
Hippocampal-damaged patients’ faulty scene construction
should impair their ability to extrapolate beyond the borders of the
scene in Phase 1, and consequently they should fail to commit the
BE memory error in Phase 2. This means that amnesic patients
should display superior performance relative to healthy controls on
the subsequent memory task. This paradoxical finding would be
notable for two reasons. First, it would allow the patients’ scene
construction and mnemonic problems to be disentangled. Second,
it would facilitate exploration of whether the patients’ scene con-
struction deficits are apparent when implicit scene construction is
required as opposed to effortfully binding together disparate scene
elements, as in the usual scene construction task.
Mullally, Intraub, and Maguire (2012) investigated BE using the
rapid serial visual presentation BE task alluded to above (see also
Figure 4a) whereby participants were consecutively presented with
two identical scenes and asked to rate the second scene relative to
the first (note that on any one trial, the two scenes were identical).
Seven patients with selective bilateral hippocampal damage and
amnesia correctly identified that the study and test pictures were
identical with greater frequency than controls, demonstrating more
veridical memory (see Figure 4b). They also made significantly
fewer BE-driven errors (“closer-up” responses), whereas the num-
ber of random errors (“farther away” responses) did not differ
between the groups. Importantly, the patients displayed greater
confidence in their correct “the same” judgments than in their
incorrect (BE-driven) closer-up responses (see Figure 4c).
Figure 4. Rapid serial visual presentation boundary extension (BE) task. (a) Timeline of an example trial. After
viewing two consecutively presented identical scenes, participants rated the perspective of the second scene
relative to the first (as “closer-up,” “the same,” or “farther away”). (b) BE is revealed by a disproportionally large
number of erroneous “closer-up” responses, which were greater for the controls than the hippocampal amnesic
patients, who made significantly more accurate (“the same”) responses. (c) The control participants were
significantly more confident when making their erroneous “closer-up” responses, whereas the patients were
significantly more confident when making their correct “the same” responses. Means (SEM). Q1  Question
1; Q2  Question 2.  p  .05. From “Attenuated Boundary Extension Produces a Paradoxical Memory
Advantage in Amnesic Patients,” by S. L. Mullally, H. Intraub, and E. A. Maguire, 2012, Current Biology, 22,
p. 263. Copyright 2012 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
1183THE HIPPOCAMPUS: A MANIFESTO FOR CHANGE
Participants also performed other BE tasks in which they drew
simple scenes from memory (drawing task; see Figure 5) and
explored and reconstructed scenes while blindfolded using touch
alone (haptic task). In both instances, the amnesic patients’ BE was
greatly attenuated. These additional tasks highlight the accuracy
with which the patients recollected the stimuli across short delays.
For instance, in the haptic task, participants were required to study
by touch alone a scene contained within four borders. At test, the
scene borders were removed, and participants pointed to where
each border had previously been positioned. Although the margins
for error here were large, the patients’ placement of the borders
was so accurate that the area of their reconstructed scenes did not
differ significantly from the area of the studied scenes. This was
not the case for controls, whose reconstructed scenes were signif-
icantly larger than the studied scenes. Overall, therefore, these
hippocampal-damaged patients had significantly reduced BE rel-
ative to healthy-matched controls across three independent mea-
sures. However, being unencumbered by the BE effect meant that
these amnesic patients displayed superior memory to that of non-
amnesic controls.
Further direct evidence that these patients could not construct or
visualize extended scenes came from a scene probe task. Partici-
pants were presented with a picture of a scene and asked to first
extend this scene in their mind’s eye and, second, to describe what
this extended scene would look like (Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire,
2012). Although the patients could accurately recount what they
expected would be beyond the given view with ample detail,
giving appropriate conceptual and contextual responses, their de-
scriptions of the extended scene had significantly fewer spatial
details (such as “on the right,” “in the distance”) than controls.
Furthermore, when asked whether they were actually able to
visualize this extended scene in their mind’s eye, the patients
typically replied no. This deficit in the visualization of extended
scenes reinforces the hippocampus’ role in the construction of
spatially coherent scenes that are not physically in view.
Mnemonic accounts (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Ranganath,
2010; Schacter et al., 2012) of scene construction are therefore
difficult to reconcile with the BE and scene probe data, as they
would contend (a) that the patients performed differently to con-
trols because they failed to encode or recollect the studied material,
an explanation clearly incompatible with the BE findings; (b) the
patients were unable to retrieve relevant constituent elements
bound to the wider scene context, which was also clearly not the
case (the scene probe data); and (c) the relational demands of the
tasks precluded the patients performing in a normal fashion. How-
ever, the relational component of visualizing an extended scene is
minimal and should be no greater in the spatial than in the
conceptual domain (scene probe data). Moreover, new evidence is
beginning to emerge suggesting that hippocampal-damaged pa-
tients can engage in counterfactual thinking (Mullally & Maguire,
2013). The patients demonstrated high-level reasoning ability,
could deconstruct reality, add in and recombine elements, and
change relations between temporal sequences of events, enabling
them to mentally simulate plausible alternatives of complex epi-
sodes. However, counterfactual simulations that required the con-
struction of an internal spatial representation were avoided by the
patients. These emerging findings add weight to the view that the
hippocampus is critical when there is a need to internally construct
a coherent spatial scene within which to play out scenarios.
A recent fMRI study has thrown further light on BE and the role
of the hippocampus. Chadwick, Mullally, and Maguire (in press)
found that in healthy controls, the extrapolation of scenes (the BE
effect) occurred rapidly around the time a scene was first viewed
and was associated with engagement of the hippocampus and
parahippocampal cortex (PHC; see Figure 6). Using connectivity
analyses, they determined that the hippocampus drove the BE
effect, exerting top-down influence on PHC and as far back down
the processing stream as early visual cortex. These cortical regions
subsequently displayed activity profiles that tracked the trial-by-
trial subjective perception of scenes, rather than the physical
Figure 5. A drawing boundary extension (BE) task. The left panel shows two example scene stimuli that were
studied for 15 s and immediately drawn from memory. The example control participants (middle and right
panels) drew a more extended expanse of background than was present in the original stimuli (demonstrating
BE). By contrast, the example patient’s drawings (left panel) are more accurate, showing a paradoxically better
memory for the studied scenes. Reprinted from “Attenuated Boundary Extension Produces a Paradoxical
Memory Advantage in Amnesic Patients,” by S. L. Mullally, H. Intraub, and E. A. Maguire, 2012, Current
Biology, 22, p. 264. Copyright 2012 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
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reality, thereby reflecting the behavioral expression of the BE
error. Thus, the hippocampus seems to directly influence our
perceptual experience of the world through the implicit extrapo-
lation of every scene we experience, a role not anticipated or
explained by purely mnemonic (or temporal or simulation-based)
accounts of hippocampal function. As such, the hippocampus and
scenes may have an even more pervasive influence on our expe-
rience of the world than hitherto appreciated.
Current Exposition of the SCT
These new findings (Chadwick et al., in press; Mullally, Intraub,
& Maguire, 2012) show that the hippocampus is not only involved
in constructing internal representations of scenes when explicitly
requested, or even when you recall a past experience, plan a route,
or imagine the future; in fact, the hippocampus is constructing
scenes all the time. It is automatically, implicitly, and online
anticipating and constructing a representation of the world beyond
any given view. Thus, the hippocampus, although obviously in-
volved in processing what you see, excels particularly at repre-
senting what you cannot see by constructing unseen scenes. In this
way, the hippocampus’ role in scene processing differs from the
contributions of other so-called scene-selective brain regions like
PHC, which is believed to represent the local visual scene (Ep-
stein, 2008, 2011) or three-dimensional space (Mullally & Magu-
ire, 2011; Zeidman, Mullally, Schwarzkopf, & Maguire, 2012),
and retrosplenial cortex, which may play a specific role in repre-
senting the most stable landmarks within an environment (Auger,
Mullally, & Maguire, 2012). Moreover, these findings imply that
the hippocampus is far from the stupid structure some have sug-
gested, simply encoding everything into consciousness obligato-
rily and unselectively, leaving other areas such as the prefrontal
cortex to sort the wheat from the chaff (Moscovitch, 2008). Nor
does it appear to be specifically concerned only with the conscious
(declarative) expression of long-term memory (Squire, 1992; but
see Hannula & Greene, 2012). Instead, we suggest the hippocam-
pus drives this automatic, anticipatory scene construction process,
the product of which is fed back down the processing stream,
enabling other areas to express the subjective experience of a
seamless and continuous reality. Patients with hippocampal dam-
age may therefore have to deal not only with problems recalling
the past and difficulties with spatial navigation and imagining
fictitious and future scenes. They may in fact be restricted to what
is in front of their eyes, deprived of a level of subjective continuity,
unable to visualize what is outside of their immediate view, what
is behind them, or what is just around the corner.
The implication of this view is that the primary role of the
hippocampus is not mnemonic. This idea is not new; in fact, some
have argued that the concept of a hippocampal memory system is
Figure 6. An functional magnetic resonance imaging study of boundary extension (BE; Chadwick et al., in
press). (a) A modified version of the task described in Figure 4 was used with healthy participants. The analysis
focused exclusively on the presentation of the first scene and contrasted trials in which the BE error was later
committed with those where it was not committed. (b) This revealed activity in the hippocampus (HC) and
parahippocampal cortex (PHC). Connectivity analyses showed that the HC seemed to drive the BE effect,
exerting top-down influence on PHC, retrosplenial cortex (RSC), and as far back down the processing stream as
early visual cortex (VC).
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actually harmful (Gaffan, 2001, 2002; Horel, 1978), proposing
instead that the hippocampus is involved “only to the extent that
spatial information is needed for some kinds of memory” (Gaffan,
2001, p. 9). As such, memory impairments in patient populations
are viewed as a by-product of their spatial processing deficits.
Although this rejection of a mnemonic function for the hippocam-
pus is extreme, others have highlighted the role of the hippocam-
pus in perception as well as memory. For example, the emergent
memory account (Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010) suggests that
memory deficits arise following medial temporal lobe damage
because regions therein aid the construction of complex conjunc-
tive object (perirhinal cortex) and spatial (hippocampus) represen-
tations that are essential for higher order perception and conse-
quently memory. This model is supported by a series of
neuropsychological (Barense et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2006; Lee,
Buckley, et al., 2005; Lee, Bussey, et al., 2005; Lee, Levi, Davies,
Hodges, & Graham, 2007) and fMRI studies (Barense, Henson,
Lee, & Graham, 2010; Lee, Brodersen, & Rudebeck, 2013), which
have led to the suggestion that the hippocampus plays a role in
complex spatial perception, and specifically in the discrimination
of complex scenes (see a review in Lee et al., 2012).
These latter observations accord with SCT in proposing that it
may be short-sighted to regard the hippocampus as purely mne-
monic. Of note, SCT can account for the above findings if one
considers the nature of the tasks used in the studies that appear to
be sensitive to hippocampal damage. One of the paradigms often
used by Lee and colleagues is the oddity task (e.g., Lee, Buckley,
et al., 2005) whereby scene stimuli are presented at different
viewing angles, and participants must identify the incongruent
scene. In such tasks, successful performance depends on intact
scene construction because participants must be able to locate each
viewpoint (and therefore reject the odd one out) within an over-
arching unified scene whose unseen aspects must be internally
generated. Thus, SCT, unlike most other hippocampal theories,
would actually predict the non-mnemonic, “perceptual” deficits
observed by Lee and colleagues. In a similar vein, SCT also
predicts hippocampal involvement in any task that requires scene
construction, including those assessing working memory (Ranga-
nath & Blumenfeld, 2005).
To summarize, although SCT does not preclude the existence of
other mechanisms within the hippocampus, such as those that
permit the binding of mnemonic details within a specific context
(Ranganath, 2010), it maintains that for the hippocampus, scenes
are special. As far as we are aware, this makes SCT unique, as no
other theory of hippocampal function has scenes at its core. The
removal of memory as the key hippocampal process enables SCT
to reconcile unexpected hippocampal findings (such as the BE data
and perceptual deficits) within a unified model that also accom-
modates the traditional mnemonic deficits observed in hippocam-
pal amnesia.
The Hippocampus and Episodic Memory
In this vein, it is important to note that SCT does not deny the
existence of severe episodic memory problems in patients who
have suffered hippocampal damage. However, it does not, as
alluded to, place memory at the epicenter of hippocampal function.
Rather, it proposes that episodic memories are encoded and rec-
ollected within a scene template, a template that is automatically
and implicitly provided by the hippocampus. In this way, episodic
memory impairments (and similarly deficits in imagining the fu-
ture and spatial navigation) can result from disruption to the
underlying scene construction process. Interestingly, however, re-
taining a basic ability to construct scenes is not sufficient to
prevent these severe memory problems. Patient P01 was first
reported by Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, and Maguire (2007) as the
only one of five densely amnesic patients with bilateral hippocam-
pal damage to have preserved scene construction ability, contrast-
ing with the grave difficulties experienced by the four other
amnesic patients. This patient’s dense amnesia coupled with his
intact scene construction therefore presented a challenge for SCT
given that scene construction is conceptualized as a foundation
step within the episodic memory hierarchy (see Figure 2).
Further investigation of P01 using fMRI revealed that when
constructing scenes, he engaged the remnant of his right hip-
pocampus (Mullally, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2012), showing that in
some hippocampal-damaged amnesic patients, scene construction
may be supported by residual hippocampal function. This finding
accords with SCT in linking the hippocampus with scene construc-
tion but is at odds with the view of Squire et al. (2010), who argued
that “for P01 future imagining was not hippocampal-dependent”
(p. 19047; see also Maguire & Hassabis, 2011). Importantly, the
data of P01 also inform the relationship between scene construc-
tion and episodic memory.
It appears that P01’s intact scene construction was not sufficient
to rescue his episodic memory. This emphasizes that episodic
memory should not be regarded as comprising scene construction
alone. Although SCT argues that the hippocampus is primarily
concerned with constructing scenes, and this underpins episodic
memory by providing the spatial backdrop within which an epi-
sodic memory is played out, SCT explicitly recognizes that epi-
sodic memory requires additional processes on top of this scene
construction process (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, 2009). One
possibility is that these additional inputs (concerned with the self
and time) are supported by an extended network of brain areas
(including the parietal and frontal cortices; Nyberg et al., 2010)
that interact with the basic scene construction process within the
hippocampus, and it is these hippocampal–cortical links that have
become disrupted in P01, adversely affecting his episodic memory.
Another possibility is that these additional processes are also
computed within the hippocampus. In this way, observations such
as hippocampal time cells (MacDonald et al., 2011) could be
accommodated within SCT. P01’s constellation of deficits could
be explicable in terms of the location of his functioning hippocam-
pal tissue, which in this case was in the right posterior hippocam-
pus—a region that may be especially important for scene construc-
tion, but less so for episodic memory processes (Addis, Pan, Vu,
Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Mullally, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2012).
More evidence is required to adjudicate between these intra- and
extrahippocampal hypotheses, and examining functional differen-
tiation down the long axis of the hippocampus may be particularly
relevant here. Regardless, however, SCT does not permit the
possibility that impaired scene construction could coexist with
preserved episodic memory (the opposite pattern to that observed
in P01) because within the SCT framework, scene construction and
episodic memory are not considered to be independent processes.
Rather, scene construction is viewed as an essential component of
episodic memory without which episodic memories could not be
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truly and vividly expressed. Identification of patients demonstrat-
ing this particular dissociation is one way in which SCT could be
falsified.
Scene Construction and Verbal Memory
A finding that is challenging for SCT, and indeed for other
hippocampal theories (Bird, Bisby, & Burgess, 2012; Moscovitch,
Nadel, Winocure, Gilboa, & Rosenbaum, 2006; O’Keefe & Nadel,
1978; Ranganath, 2010; Schacter & Addis, 2009), is why patients
with hippocampal amnesia are usually impaired on verbally me-
diated memory tasks such as recalling short stories and word-pair
associates. One possibility is that scenes allow us to collate a lot of
information in a quick, coherent, and efficient manner, and so we
automatically use scene imagery during encoding and retrieval.
For instance, we might visualize the context in which the story is
unfolding, or place the items described in the word pairs in a
simple scene together. Although this is speculative, it is not dis-
similar to the mnemonic techniques, such as the method of loci,
introduced in ancient Roman and Greek rhetorical treatises, in
which memory for items is aided by placing them in specific
physical locations. Despite the rise and fall of imagery-based
memory theories across the decades (Paivio, 1969), there is much
evidence to suggest that visual imagery not only boosts paired-
associate recall in healthy participants but also enabled patients
with left temporal lobectomies to partially compensate for their
verbal memory deficits (Jones, 1974). If verbal memory tasks
benefit from the use of imagery-based mnemonic strategies, and if
these strategies involve scenes, then hippocampal patients would
be disadvantaged on such tasks because of their scene construction
problems. Alternatively, it could be that the neural processes
supporting scene construction are also suited to coupling simpler
stimuli together (such as two unrelated words), and in this way,
hippocampal mechanisms originally developed to support scene
construction and episodic memory have further evolved to support
processing of non-scene stimuli. We suggest that exploring, in a
wide-ranging and systematic fashion, the exact strategies people
use when performing verbally mediated tasks may help in eluci-
dating this important issue, which is one not discussed enough by
extant hippocampal theories.
Scene Construction and the Cognitive Map Theory
The hippocampus has long been linked to spatial navigation,
with place cells in the hippocampus exhibiting location-specific
firing (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971). This led to the cognitive
map theory, which posits that a fundamental function of the
hippocampus is the construction and maintenance of allocentric
spatial maps of the environment (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). This
spatial role might also account for episodic memory deficits be-
cause personal memories always occur in a spatial context (Bur-
gess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002). SCT and cognitive map theory
on the surface appear to have much in common. However, an
important difference becomes obvious when considering the most
recent incarnation of the cognitive map theory, the boundary
vector cell (BVC) model (reviewed in Bird et al., 2012).
The BVC model proposes that hippocampal place cell firing
(thresholded via inputs from BVC s that code the location of the rat
relative to environmental boundaries) functions to enable an ani-
mal to form a representation of where it thinks it is in the envi-
ronment. In this way, environmental boundaries are considered to
be central to spatial cognition, aiding the encoding, retrieval, and
imagination of spatial contexts. The findings that hippocampal
activity appears to be correlated with the number of boundaries
imagined during fMRI (Bird, Capponi, King, Doeller, & Burgess,
2010) and place cell activity becomes less spatially specific when
boundaries are removed (Barry et al., 2006) appear to bolster this
argument.
However, given the BE findings, SCT views physical environ-
mental boundaries differently, arguing instead that a place cell’s
response to the presence of boundaries could be due to the in-
creased demand for it to compute what might be on the other side
of the boundary (as this is now hidden from view). Similarly, the
decrease in spatial specificity observed as a consequence of bound-
ary removal may arise because these computations are no longer
needed (see also Hayman, Donnett, & Jeffery, 2008, who reported
a failure of place cells to be controlled by an acoustic, as opposed
to a visually occluding, boundary). In this way, the BVC model
views boundaries as inward bounding (containing the space within
specific boundaries), whereas SCT views boundaries (either phys-
ical boundaries such as walls or the edges of our current view) as
outward looking, the point from which the hippocampus must
extrapolate in order to make predictions about, and so imagine, the
upcoming spatial environment.
Conclusions
The nub, then, of our proposal is that scenes are the primary
currency of the hippocampus. For many of us, scenes are the
language of thought, and we argue that the hippocampus actively
and automatically predicts and constructs the scenes we need to
fuel our cognition. Up until now, scenes have not featured prom-
inently in accounts of hippocampal function. SCT, although not
denying the important role of the hippocampus in memory, chal-
lenges us to consider how it accomplishes this, and urges consid-
eration of the potential importance of scenes. The memory litera-
ture is awash with experiments investigating hippocampal
processes (such as associative memory) that have used scene
stimuli but that pay little or no attention to the effect of the scenes
themselves. Recognizing the possibility that the scene stimuli
could be influencing hippocampal function could alter the conclu-
sions of such studies.
SCT’s perspective on the hippocampus not only offers a poten-
tially unifying model for understanding the disparate roles of the
hippocampus, but could facilitate a new hippocampal dialogue
because, unlike episodic memory, scenes are amenable to testing
in a range of species (Killian, Jutras, & Buffalo, 2012). The
construction of scenes and BE involve anticipating what is likely
to be beyond the view. This also resonates with emerging ideas
concerning prior knowledge and schema (Tse et al., 2007), tem-
plates (Dragoi & Tonegawa, 2011), and predictive coding (Friston,
2010). Importantly, then, scene construction generates new ques-
tions and testable hypotheses that could provide fresh impetus to
the field.
Clearly, this view requires much further investigation and nu-
ancing, not least to elucidate the status of BE in patients with
lesions (bilateral and unilateral) in areas other than the hippocam-
pus, to uncover exactly how the hippocampus facilitates scene
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construction, to examine the precise relationship of scene construc-
tion with computations that occur in the hippocampus such as
pattern separation and pattern completion (which may underpin the
BE effect), and of course to definitively establish that an inability
to construct scenes directly explains the full constellation of def-
icits that arise from hippocampal pathology. Nevertheless, by
releasing the hippocampus from currently constrained accounts of
its function, we believe that a theoretically enriched understanding
of its fundamental role and its breakdown in pathology can
emerge.
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